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BROADENING ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE COMMODITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT 
Benjamin D. Pearce* 
INTRODUCTION 
Futures trading can result in both large gains on a relatively 
small investment as well as similarly large losses on the same 
investment.1 The Commodities Exchange Act2 (the “CEA” or the 
“Act”) was enacted to regulate the futures markets.3 The CEA 
provides for a private right of action against brokers, exchanges and 
related organizations that have manipulated the commodities 
futures markets in violation of the Act.4 The extent of actual 
damages under the Act, however, remains uncertain.5 
Although the CEA, as originally enacted, was silent about 
private rights of action,6 many courts found them to be implied.7 In 
                                                           
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.A. in Economics, Colby 
College, 2003. 
1 NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, OPPORTUNITY AND RISK: AN EDUCATIONAL 
GUIDE TO TRADING FUTURES AND OPTIONS ON FUTURES 5 (2006). 
2 Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27(f) (2007). 
3 The CEA was enacted as “a comprehensive regulatory structure to oversee 
the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex.” H.R. REP. NO. 93-975, at 1 
(1974). 
4 7 U.S.C. § 25(b). 
5 In re Cannon, 230 B.R. 546, 594 (W.D. Tenn. 1999), rev’d on other 
grounds; Stevenson v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22634 
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2000); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53, 58 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 
486, 494–95 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
6 Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 622 F.2d 216, 230 
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1982, the Supreme Court held that purchasers of futures contracts 
that were subject to improper manipulation in violation of the CEA 
could maintain a private right of action against dealers, brokers and 
exchanges.8 Within a year, Congress ratified this holding by 
enacting Section 22 of the CEA, which provided for an explicit 
private right of action and recovery of “actual damages” for 
victorious plaintiffs.9 
Notwithstanding that private right of action, what “actual 
damages” are within the context of futures trading manipulation and 
the CEA remains unclear.10 Actual damages is a common legal 
remedy that has been construed narrowly in some areas of law11 
and broadly in others.12 Generally, actual damages are considered 
synonymous with compensatory damages.13 The Supreme Court, 
in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,14 found actual damages to 
                                                           
(6th Cir. 1980). 
7 Id. 
8 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394 
(1982). 
9 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1). 
10 Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594. 
11 See Mack v. Johnson, 430 F. Supp. 1139, 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1977) 
(defining actual damages in a civil rights suit as “including out-of-pocket, or 
pecuniary losses, as well as compensation for physical and mental suffering”); 
Wilson v. Prasse, 325 F. Supp. 9, 15 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (defining actual 
damages in another civil rights suit as “expenses for which plaintiff was out of 
pocket for food purchased from the commissary and also for humiliation, 
embarrassment and mental suffering”). 
12 See United States v. State Road Dept. of Fla., 189 F.2d 591, 596 (5th 
Cir. 1951) (finding, in a situation where a bridge was damaged by boats in a 
storm, that the requirement of the statute of “actual damages to the highway by 
reason of his wrongful act” included more than “the cost of repairing and 
restoring;” it included consequential damages as well); On Davis v. The Gap, 
Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (proposing that in copyright law a broad 
construction of actual damages is appropriate). 
13 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2nd pocket ed. 
2001). Compensatory damages are “damages, measured by the harm suffered, 
awarded to the injured person as due compensation.” Dictionary.com, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/compensatory damages (last visited Sept. 
28, 2007). 
14 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
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be “the difference between the fair value of all that the [plaintiff] 
received and the fair value of what he would have received had 
there been no fraudulent conduct.”15 
This definition of actual damages is problematic because it 
provides little incentive for individuals with a small economic 
injury to pursue private rights of action, and as a result, this limited 
incentive to private litigants renders the private right of action less 
effective as a device to bring miscreants to justice for their 
manipulations. This problem manifests itself in situations where, 
because of the nature of the futures markets, a manipulator realizes 
and retains a significant windfall without a mechanism for 
disgorgement.16 Such a result can occur because particular investors 
may not bring suit;17 these investors either do not know they have 
been defrauded or the high cost of litigation would not justify the 
damages they could be awarded if they initiated proceedings. In 
such cases, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”) may bring suit in district court against the manipulator 
on behalf of the market participants.18 However, if the CFTC fails 
to bring suit, a market manipulator may retain a significant portion 
of prior gains. Further, if damages are restricted to a measurement 
                                                           
15 Id. at 155; see also Strobl v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 582 F. Supp. 770, 
779 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
16 E.g., Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Heffernan, 274 F. 
Supp. 2d 1375, 1377 n.1 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (no particular investor was victimized 
but the defendant managed to defraud his way into $275,000). The private right 
of action under the CEA does not provide a mechanism for disgorgement. 7 
U.S.C. § 25(b) (2007). 
17 7 U.S.C. § 25(b) (2007). 
18 An example can be seen in Heffernan, where the CFTC brought an 
action against Heffernan for CEA violations without alleging victimization of 
any particular investor. Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 n.1. There the court 
used its broad equitable powers to issue a remedy of disgorgement. Id. See also 
Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978). Thus, the 
Heffernan case illustrates that when a particular investor suffers injury because of 
some form of market misconduct and files suit, the defrauding party could have 
profited more than any one particular investor lost. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13a-1 (1999); 
Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 n.1. See also Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 
30 (1st Cir. 2003); Estate of Pidcock v. Sunnyland America, 726 F. Supp. 1322 
(S.D. Ga. 1989). 
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of the loss the plaintiff suffered, but the defendant’s profit from 
the fraudulent transaction is greater than that loss, the defendant 
will still benefit from the fraudulent conduct despite the judgment 
against him.19 
This perverse result leads to a more disturbing policy concern: 
the CEA, which was designed to deter manipulative practices in the 
futures markets, could be used to protect defendants from, rather 
than subject defendants to, significant liability, provided potential 
plaintiff loss levels are kept below potential defendant profit 
margins.20 To prevent this contradictory result, and to enhance the 
deterrent and remedial effect of the private right of action, actual 
damages within the meaning of the CEA should be clarified to reach 
beyond strict compensatory damages. 
This Note interprets the meaning of actual damages in the 
context of the CEA. Part I briefly reviews the general meaning of 
actual damages. Part II summarizes the history and functions of the 
CEA and the commodity futures markets. Part III presents 
arguments in favor of a flexible interpretation of actual damages 
based on the legislative history of the Act, the nature of futures 
markets, the similarities between commodities and securities law 
that suggest similar interpretations of the term are appropriate, the 
interpretation of actual damages in the context of the similarly 
worded Securities Exchange Act (“SEA”) and a look at other areas 
of law that have used actual damages as a measure of recovery and 
have addressed similar policy concerns to those presented in this 
Note. Part IV proposes two solutions, both of which require a 
flexible interpretation of actual damages, to the situation posed in 
                                                           
19 See, e.g., Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 n.1; Commodities 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1978); Lawton v. 
Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 428, 440–44 (D.R.I. 2005); City of San Jose v. 
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8318 (N.D. Cal. 
June 6, 1991); Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211 
(7th Cir. 1979); Pidcock, 726 F. Supp. at 1334–38. 
20 See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986) (using similar 
reasoning to reach the same conclusion in the securities context with regards to 
the interpretation of actual damages in § 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act; 
there limiting the plaintiff’s recovery to actual damages would have allowed the 
defendant to retain money obtained through illegal conduct). 
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this Note where a defendant stands to profit from his fraudulent 
conduct. Finally, Part V concludes that a more flexible 
interpretation of actual damages is appropriate. 
I. ACTUAL DAMAGES GENERALLY 
For private recovery under the Act, a plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant’s fraudulent conduct was one of four types of 
transactions covered by the statute and that the injury was caused 
by at least one of those transactions.21 This was illustrated in Ping 
He v. NonFerrous Metals Inc.,22 where the plaintiff’s otherwise 
valid CEA claims were dismissed because he failed to prove that 
the defendant’s conduct caused him to suffer “actual damages.”23 
                                                           
21 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) provides as follows: 
[a]ny person . . . violates this chapter or who willfully aids, abets, 
counsels, induces, or procures the commission of a violation of this 
chapter shall be liable for actual damages resulting from one or more of 
the transactions referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of this 
paragraph and caused by such violation to any person- 
(A) who received trading advice from such person for a fee; 
(B) who made through such person any contract of sale of any 
commodity for future delivery (or option on such contract or any 
commodity); or who deposited with or paid to such person money, 
securities, or property . . . in connection with any order to make such 
contract; 
(C) who purchased from or sold to such person or placed through such 
person an order for the purchase or sale of- 
(i) an option subject to section 6c of this title . . . ; 
(ii) a contract subject to section 23 of this title; or 
(iii) an interest or participation in a commodity pool; or 
(D) who purchased or sold a contract referred to in subparagraph (B) 
hereof if the violation constitutes a manipulation of the price of any 
such contract or the price of the commodity underlying such contract. 
22 22 F. Supp. 2d 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
23 Id. at 108. The Court dismissed a valid § 4b claim that NonFerrous 
Metals was an unregistered Futures Commodities Manager (“FCM”) because 
Ping He failed to prove that investing with an unregistered FCM resulted in his 
alleged injury. Id. 
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The court wrote, “there is no legal justification for permitting 
private litigants to recover damages unless they can show that they 
were personally harmed by the defendant’s violation, in the 
amount of damages sought.”24 
Even if a plaintiff proves that an alleged violation directly 
resulted in the injury, the components and extent of those damages 
must still be identified. Black’s Law Dictionary defines actual 
damages as “[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate 
for a proven injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses.”25 In 
most cases, actual damages will be interpreted to mean 
compensatory damages,26 out-of-pocket loss or some variation on 
those concepts; nonetheless, actual damages can, and have been 
construed differently.27 For instance, some courts have found that 
actual damages can include emotional and mental distress,28 
although others have declined to hold the same.29 
Even today, the meaning of actual damages is unclear.30 The 
Supreme Court in Randall v. Loftsgaarden,31 tempered its holding 
                                                           
24 Id. 
25 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2nd pocket ed. 
2001). 
26 See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Clay, 194 F.2d 888 (D.C. 
Cir. 1952); United States v. State Road Dept. of Fla., 189 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 
1951); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2nd 
pocket ed. 2001). 
27 See In re Der, 113 B.R. 218, 231 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) (citing Randall 
v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986)) (supporting a “rescissory” measure 
of recovery); see also Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984); 
Lawton v. Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 428, 442 (D.R.I. 2005). 
28 See, e.g., Wilson v. Prasse, 325 F. Supp. 9, 15 (W.D. Pa. 1971) 
(characterizing actual damages as “out of pocket” loss that included monetary 
loss and compensation for “humiliation, embarrassment and mental suffering.”); 
see also Mack v. Johnson, 430 F. Supp. 1139, 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1977) 
(distinguishing actual damages from nominal, punitive or exemplary damages); 
see generally Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 
1999); Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 
543 (D. Colo. 1977). 
29 See Emmons v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 532 F. 
Supp. 480, 485 (S.D. Ohio 1982). 
30 In re Cannon, 230 B.R. 546, 594 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). 
31 478 U.S. 647 (1986). 
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in Affiliated Ute Citizens,32 finding that the measure for actual 
damages “ordinarily . . . ‘is the difference between the fair value of 
all that the [plaintiff] received and the fair value of what he would 
have received had there been no fraudulent conduct.’”33 The 
Court’s use of the term ‘ordinarily’ implies that in certain 
situations a different meaning of actual damages will be 
appropriate. Some courts have used the traditional interpretation of 
actual damages based on the facts, despite acknowledging the 
Loftsgaarden rationale,34 while other courts have employed a more 
expansive approach.35 
Given the various circumstances under which courts have been 
willing to expand the meaning of actual damages beyond that found 
in Black’s Law Dictionary, it may be wise to incorporate the 
Loftsgaarden rationale by applying a fact specific approach to 
interpreting the actual damages language in the CEA. 
II. THE COMMODITIES EXCHANGES AND THE HISTORY OF 
REGULATION 
The public generally has little knowledge of the workings and 
behaviors of commodity futures. That “lack of comprehension,” 
combined with significant growth of the markets over time, has 
worked “to hamper effective regulation and create an atmosphere 
ripe for fraud.”36 In order to understand how actual damages should 
be interpreted in light of the CEA, it is helpful to examine the 
history of the commodity futures markets, as well as the reasoning 
                                                           
32 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) 
(holding actual damages to be “the difference between the fair value of all that 
the [plaintiff] received and the fair value of what he would have received had there 
been no fraudulent conduct.”). 
33 Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 662 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 
U.S. at 155). 
34 Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Minpeco 
v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 486, 494–95 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987). 
35 Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594–95 (awarding gross trading losses rather than 
the standard net economic loss based on the Loftsgaarden rationale). 
36 S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 1 (1982). 
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and goals behind their regulation. 
A commodity37 futures contract is a type of forward contract 
in which parties agree to buy or sell a specific quantity and quality 
of goods at a specified future date.38 There are two types of futures 
contracts: long and short.39 “The person who has sold a futures 
contract, i.e., someone committed to deliver the commodity in the 
future, is said to be in a ‘short’ position. Conversely, someone 
committed to accept delivery is ‘long.’”40 
Consequently, for those investors not interested in the actual 
commodities, their number of short contracts must equal their long 
contracts.41 After discussing this nature of the commodity trading 
                                                           
37 Within the meaning of the CEA, a commodity has grown over time to 
encompass a wider array of goods. Early on, few goods were traded as 
commodities, mainly agricultural products such as “eggs, butter vegetables and 
grain.” S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 1. Later, as the markets grew, other agricultural 
products, such as cotton, began being traded on exchanges, mainly Chicago and 
New York. Id. at 2–3. The 1968 amendments to the CEA added “livestock, 
livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice” to the list of traded 
commodities. Id. at 3. Up until the 1972 amendments trading was mainly in 
physical commodities such as “agricultural products and commercial metals.” 
H.R. REP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5 (1982). The Maine Potato was the commodity at 
issue in the Curran case. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 
U.S. 353, 355 (1982). Silver was the commodity at issue in another case. Strax 
v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  
 However, as the markets grew over time, the coverage of the CEA grew 
beyond physical commodities, securities and other financial instruments began 
being traded as futures. H.R. REP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5. In the late 1970s, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission approved other financial instruments 
such as stock index futures and leverage contracts for trade. S. REP. NO. 97-495, 
at 49. The 1974 amendments expanded CEA coverage to include “all . . . 
goods and articles . . . and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts 
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.” Curran, 456 U.S. at 
366 n.29. 
38 Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1980). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 “Money is made or lost in the price different [sic] between the original 
contract and the offsetting transaction.” Id. Because of this nature of the futures 
markets, “[a] person seeking to liquidate his futures position must form an 
opposite contract for the same quantity, so that his obligations under the two 
contracts will offset each other.” Id. 
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market, Judge Henry Friendly of the United States Court of 
Appeals, Second Circuit observed that “[f]utures trading is a zero-
sum game. Since money is made from the change in futures contract 
prices, and every contract has a long and a short,42 every gain can 
be matched with a corresponding loss.”43 
Generally, there are two types of investors that participate in 
the futures markets; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) classified them as “hedgers” and “speculators.”44 Hedgers 
are usually dealers of the actual commodities who seek to lessen 
the risk associated with price movements whereas speculators seek 
to profit from the same price movements.45 
Most buyers and sellers are speculators and do not deal in the 
actual commodities involved in the futures contracts.46 Instead, 
these speculators try to profit from price fluctuations by 
liquidating their contracts prior to the date specified for the 
delivery of the commodity.47 Speculators make or lose money 
based on the price difference between their long and short 
                                                           
42 Id. 
43 Leist, 638 F.2d 286–87. 
44 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS IN RESPONSE TO SECTION 21 OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, 
96th Congress, 2d session ch. II, at 6 (1981). 
Typically, a hedger is engaged in the production, distribution, 
processing or consumption of the actual commodity or its byproducts. 
In a representative situation, the hedger holding an inventory of the 
physical commodity may establish an offsetting short position in the 
corresponding futures markets. In contrast, the speculator does not 
endeavor to reduce the price risk of a cash market position but rather to 
profit by anticipating the price movement of a commodity in which a 
futures position has been established. In effect, the speculator assumes 
the risk of price movements that the hedger seeks to avoid.  
Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. See also NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, OPPORTUNITY AND RISK: AN 
EDUCATIONAL GUIDE TO TRADING FUTURES AND OPTIONS ON FUTURES 4 
(2006). 
47 Leist, 638 F.2d at 286. Speculators, essentially, bet that prices of a 
particular commodity will either rise or fall and they make money by guessing 
correctly. Id. 
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contracts.48 
In the early days of the futures markets, this speculative 
activity of buying and selling futures contracts with no intention of 
dealing in the goods was viewed as a form of legalized gambling.49 
Despite that stigma, speculators play an essential role in the 
market because they absorb risk from hedgers50 and create more 
trading volume and liquidity in the market, enabling hedgers and 
other investors to trade in large contracts.51 
Hedgers also play an important role in the futures markets. 
Hedgers transfer their business risks to speculators by engaging in 
either short or long contracts to offset the contracts they have 
already made in connection with their businesses, thereby 
mitigating the effects of price fluctuations in their particular 
commodity.52 For example, if a hedger is a corn farmer, in order to 
protect against falling prices in the corn market and thus declining 
value of his corn, he will buy offsetting futures contracts for corn, 
                                                           
48 Id. 
49 Michael S. Sackheim, Parameters of Express Private Rights of Action 
for Violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 51, 54 
(1984). 
50  Leist, 638 F.2d at 287. “A ‘hedger’ is a trader with an interest in the 
cash market for the commodity, who deals in futures contracts as a means of 
transferring risks he faces in the cash market.” Id. 
51 H.R. REP. NO. 93-975, at 138 (1974); see also David T. Johnston, 
Understanding the Dynamics of Commodity Trading: A Success Story, 35 BUS. 
LAW 705, 709 (1980) (“As a general rule, for a market to be broad enough to be 
efficient and to accommodate the extremely large orders that come in from time 
to time from dealers and commercial firms, 50 to 75 percent of the open interest 
and volume of trading must come from speculators—this is essential for there to 
be a viable market.”). 
52 Leist, 638 F.2d at 287–88. Judge Friendly summed up this principle 
nicely: 
The owner of a commodity can hedge against declining prices 
by entering into equivalent short futures contracts for the month when 
he expects to be able to sell, and a processor (e. g., a miller) can hedge 
against increasing prices by going long for the month when he will 
need the commodity. Losses caused by a decline in prices on the cash 
market in the former case or an advance in the latter will be offset by 
profits in the futures transactions. 
Id. 
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essentially betting that the price of corn will fall. As a result, if the 
price of corn falls, he will lose money on his crop but his futures 
investment will make money, thus minimizing the effects of the 
price fluctuation.53 
Consumers benefit as well from the hedging function of the 
markets because by mitigating the risk of price fluctuations and 
thus the risk of doing business, a merchant can more safely operate 
his business on a lower profit margin without fear of business 
failure due to a drop in the price of his commodity.54 As a result, 
he can charge lower prices to distributors who in turn can charge 
lower prices to consumers.55 
Regulation of the futures markets has long been the subject of 
legislative debate.56 The original Commodities Exchange Act was 
enacted in 1936.57 The Act built upon previous regulatory 
legislation58 by expanding its coverage to more commodities59 and 
attempt[ing] to curb excessive speculation by the large market 
operator.”60 The goal of enacting the CEA was “to insure fair 
practice and honest dealing on the commodity exchanges and to 
provide a measure of control over those forms of speculative 
activity which too often demoralize the markets to the injury of 
                                                           
53 However, the converse also must be true; if the price of corn rises, the 
hedger’s crop will increase in value but he will simultaneously lose money on 
his futures investment. 
54 H.R. REP. NO. 93-975, at 132–33. 
55 Id. 
56 See Sackheim, supra note 49, at 51–63. 
57 Commodities Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)). 
58 See Leist, 638 F.2d at 293. The Futures Trading Act of 1921 and The 
Grain Futures Act of 1922 were predecessors to the CEA, the first of which was 
declared unconstitutional. The former as an impermissible use of the taxing 
power in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) and the latter was a valid use of 
the commerce power decided in Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). 
Leist, 638 F.2d at 293. 
59 Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining 
the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 353 (1987). 
60 S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 3 (1982). The act accomplished this by 
“authoriz[ing] the prosecution of price manipulation as a criminal offense” and 
“extend[ing] to the previously uncovered field of commodity brokerage.” Id. 
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producers and consumers and the exchanges themselves.”61 
The CEA was amended to increase the level of regulation62 in 
196863 and again in 1974.64 During the time between the 1968 
amendments and the 1974 amendments, the economy changed so 
that the futures markets started having a greater effect on the prices 
of commodities.65 Fraud was on the rise mainly because of the lack 
of regulation and the emergence of new financial futures 
instruments that were not covered by the CEA.66 The 1974 
Amendments created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”) to provide further regulation to the industry and solve 
the concerns that had arisen since the 1968 amendments.67 This 
organization was modeled after the Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) and was deemed necessary to bridge the 
“regulatory gap” that existed in the area of commodity futures 
trading.68 
In 1982, the CEA was amended once again to expressly reflect 
the recognition of a private right of action under the Act.69 The 
                                                           
61 H.R. REP. NO. 74-421, at 1 (1935). 
62 S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 3 (“Futures Commission Merchants (FCM) were 
required to meet specific minimum financial standards, penalties were increased 
for certain violations, and the issuance of cease and desist orders was authorized. 
These amendments required contract markets to enforce their trading rules and 
contract terms . . . .”). 
63 Id. 
64 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)). 
65 S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 3. The government used to mitigate price 
fluctuations in actual consumer goods by holding stockpiles of goods and 
releasing them at times when prices rose rapidly, thus creating more supply, 
which, in turn, kept prices down. The government stockpiles soon ran out and 
the fluctuations in the prices in the commodity futures markets began to have a 
greater effect on consumer commodity prices and the producers themselves. Id. at 
3–4. 
66 Id. For a detailed discussion of leverage transactions and fraudulent 
“Boiler Room” scandals, see S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 4–16. 
67 Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 295–96 (2d Cir. 1980) (further noting 
that the provisions for fraud and trading limits that came from the 1968 
Amendments were largely unchanged); see also Sackheim, supra note 49, at 
58–60. 
68 Sackheim, supra note 49, at 59 n.49. 
69 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (2000). 
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Supreme Court acknowledged this right in its decision in Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran.70 The Senate concluded 
that a private right of action was necessary for efficient resolution 
of claims under the CEA to avoid a “proceeding in the Reparations 
Section of the CFTC.”71 Before the Curran decision, a plaintiff 
seeking recompense for a loss would have to go through the 
CFTC—“a process which is often erratic, overburdened and rarely 
effective.”72 
One commentator has remarked that “[t]he passage of the 1982 
Act represented what has been referred to as a ‘comprehensive’ 
legislative overhauling of the federal regulatory scheme for the 
futures industry and related industries.”73 Each amendment to the 
CEA has increased regulatory power over the futures markets, 
increased the breadth and force of penalties and brought more 
commodities under the purview of the Act.74 Thus, the 
interpretation of actual damages under the CEA “must be 
considered against this background of increasingly strong regulation 
designed to insure the existence of fair and orderly markets.”75 
III.  A BROAD DEFINITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES UNDER THE 
CEA SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES 
Actual damages should be defined broadly enough that the 
threat of liability would work to prevent inequity and to further 
the purposes of the CEA. In most situations, actual damages 
should continue to be restricted to out-of-pocket loss. However, in 
other situations, particularly where a defendant stands to profit 
from his fraudulent and manipulative conduct, courts should be 
able and willing to apply remedies of disgorgement or rescission. 
This section provides arguments to support this formulation. 
                                                           
70 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394 
(1982) (recognizing an implied private right of action under the CEA). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Sackheim, supra note 49, at 63 (citations omitted). 
74 Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 296 (2d Cir. 1980). 
75 Id. 
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Part A highlights support in the legislative history of the CEA. 
Part B shows that the growing and changing nature of commodity 
futures markets necessitates a greater measure of deterrence to 
manipulators and that a flexible interpretation of actual damages 
can accomplish that goal. Part C demonstrates that, in light of the 
growing similarities between commodities and securities trading, 
the CEA provisions for damages should be interpreted similarly to 
the analogous provisions under the SEA. Part D shows that the 
principle enunciated in Loftsgaarden—that it is better for victims 
of misconduct to benefit rather than the perpetrators and similarly, 
allowing the perpetrators to benefit from their misconduct would 
only encourage more misconduct—is neither novel nor unique to 
securities law and should be applied to the commodities realm. 
Finally, Part E addresses why a flexible measure of damages is 
appropriate in light of the CFTC’s ability to compel manipulators 
to disgorge their ill-gotten profits.76 
A.  Legislative Support for a Flexible Interpretation of Actual 
Damages 
An examination of the legislative history of the often-amended 
CEA supports the propositions that actual damages should not be 
strictly interpreted and that in certain situations flexibility in 
damage awards is appropriate.77 
Reckless speculation and manipulative trading practices led to 
the need for congressional regulation.78 Congress recognized the 
importance of the hedgers and speculators and has endeavored to 
preserve their functions through their scheme of regulation.79 
                                                           
76 See Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 
2d 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2003); Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Muller, 
570 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1978). 
77 See generally S. REP. NO. 97-495 (1982); H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 2 
(1982); H.R. REP. NO. 74-421 (1934); H.R. REP. NO. 93-975 (1974); H.R. 
CONF. REP. NO. 97-964 (1982). 
78 S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 2. 
79 The CFTC was given the “responsibility of ensuring that the futures 
markets fulfill their historic functions of providing opportunities for hedging 
against future price fluctuations in commodities and mechanisms for locking in 
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Congress was compelled to walk a thin line between deterring 
excessive speculation and keeping a significant volume of 
speculators involved in the market.80 
Thus, throughout the legislative history of the CEA, two 
competing interests have influenced Congressional decision-making: 
(1) providing for a fair and safe market place by deterring 
manipulation and fraudulent behavior,81 and (2) preserving the 
hedging function of the markets that was deemed essential for the 
protection of the actual producers and buyers of commodities.82 
The proper interpretation of actual damages within the context of 
the CEA should seek to satisfy these two competing interests. 
1.  A History of Deterrence 
Deterrence of manipulative activities has always been a driving 
force behind efforts at regulation since the 1800’s when 
“[s]peculative excesses, irresponsible trading and lack of effective 
market regulation eventually stirred farm resentment and led to a 
movement . . . to abolish futures trading.”83 As markets grew and 
began to encompass more commodities,84 the need for deterrence 
grew as well.85 Congress responded by consistently amending the 
Act.86 Through its amendments, Congress has steadily increased 
the breadth of statutory coverage, strengthened the powers of 
                                                           
commodity prices at future dates.” H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5. 
80 The goals of enacting the CEA were “to insure fair practice and honest 
dealing on the commodity exchanges and to provide a measure of control over 
those forms of speculative activity which too often demoralize the markets to the 
injury of producers and consumers and the exchanges themselves.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 74-421, at 1. 
81 S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 2; Donald Campbell, Trading in Futures Under 
the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 215, 223 (1958); see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 74-421, at 1, supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
82 H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5. 
83 S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 2. 
84 Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 295–96 (2d Cir. 1980). 
85 Id.; S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 1–4. 
86 Leist, 638 F.2d at 296. 
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regulation and heightened the penalties pursuant to the Act.87 The 
trend of increased and strengthened regulation suggests that the goal 
of deterring manipulative behavior was becoming more important. 
Congress’s decisions over time to increase penalties under the 
CEA mirrored the perceived need for deterrence. While punitive 
damages are not provided for under either the CEA88 or federal 
securities anti-fraud laws,89 the CEA does provide for criminal 
sanctions.90 In 1936, provisions91 for criminal offenses were 
extended to cover the newly enacted provisions of the amendment 
as well as market and price manipulation.92 These were essentially 
limited to misdemeanors resulting in fines and imprisonment.93 
These limitations did not persist.94 In the 1968 Amendments, 
Congress elevated criminal price manipulation to a felony offense 
and increased the corresponding maximum prison sentence five-
fold.95 Just six years later, Congress increased the maximum fine 
associated with the penalty provisions ten-fold.96 Section 13(a) of 
the CEA provides for accomplice liability so that willfully or 
knowingly aiding in a violation of the CEA may subject a person to 
                                                           
87 Id. 
88 See 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2000). 
89 See Sackheim, supra note 49, at 80 n.185. 
90 S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 3 (“The [1936] amendments authorized the 
prosecution of price manipulation as a criminal offense.”). 
91 See Leist, 638 F.2d at 293–94. Similar provisions, invoking similar 
penalties, were encompassed in the CEA predecessorsThe Futures Trading 
Act of 1921 and The Grain Futures Act of 1922. Id. 
92 Id. at 295. 
93 Id. at 293–94 (the penalties were essentially a carry over from the original 
Futures Trading Act and provided for “a fine of up to $10,000 and/or 
imprisonment for up to one year.”); see also 49 Stat. 1491, 1501 (1936) 
(amended by 82 Stat. 26, 33 (1968)). 
94 Leist, 638 F.2d at 295. 
95 Id. In particular, embezzlement and price manipulation became felony 
offenses carrying greater prison sentences than they previously did as 
misdemeanors. The maximum sentence went up from one year to five years. 82 
Stat. 26, 33–34 (1968). 
96 Leist, 638 F.2d at 295 (fines increased from a maximum of $10,000 to 
$100,000). 
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prosecution as a principal.97 This section of the Act substantially 
mirrors federal criminal statutes for aiding and abetting.98 
Congress’s ascension from misdemeanor penalties to felony 
offenses,99 together with the ability to prosecute for willful 
conduct of someone who is not a principal,100 has demonstrated a 
significant and growing interest in deterrence. 
2.  Preserving Hedging 
Preservation of the ability of the futures markets to continue to 
provide an opportunity for hedging is an equally weighty interest 
that must not be undermined by policies aimed at deterring market 
and price manipulation.101 Further, the participation of speculators 
in the markets is essential to ensure that the hedging function of the 
markets is maintained.102 Thus, to serve both Congressional 
interests, the legislature must carefully craft policies that deter 
manipulation but that do not deter speculation. 
3.  A Flexible Interpretation of Actual Damages Accomplishes both 
Legislative Goals 
Allowing flexibility in the interpretation of actual damages is a 
particularly effective method of deterring manipulation while 
retaining the participation of speculators in the market. Permitting 
courts to either give the defendant’s windfall to a plaintiff or 
otherwise strip the defendant of his profits would prevent unjust 
enrichment in cases where the defendant stands to benefit from his 
wrongdoing. The prospect of the loss of all of the malefactor’s 
illegal gain would deter similar manipulative conduct. Therefore, if 
potential wrongdoers were contemplating violating one of the CEA 
                                                           
97 7 U.S.C. § 13(c)(a) (1982). 
98 Sackheim, supra note 49, at 87. 
99 Leist, 638 F.2d at 295. 
100 7 U.S.C. § 13(c)(a) (1982). 
101 H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5–6 (1982). 
102 H.R. REP. NO. 93-975, at 138 (1974); see also Johnston, supra note 
51, at 709. 
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provisions, they would have to consider the full extent of the 
greater risks associated with being caught. 
Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the purposes of 
the CEA because it would not have a deterrent effect on 
speculators.103 By definition, honest speculators would never be 
reached by this penalty because they do not intend to violate the 
CEA. In fact, a flexible interpretation of actual damages could 
potentially, work to encourage speculative investors to put money 
into the markets because it would work to better ensure a fair and 
orderly functioning of the markets. 
Accordingly, a flexible interpretation of actual damages would 
not be contrary to the legislative concerns surrounding the CEA 
and would, in all likelihood, further the goal of “insur[ing] fair 
practice and honest dealing on the commodity exchanges and 
[providing] a measure of control over those forms of speculative 
activity which too often demoralize the markets to the injury of 
producers and consumers and the exchanges themselves.”104 
B.  The Nature and Size of the Futures Markets Necessitate a 
Flexible Interpretation of Actual Damages 
As markets grow and expand their coverage to more diverse 
types of futures contracts,105 they create an “atmosphere ripe for 
fraud”106 because investor comprehension may lag behind the 
shenanigans practiced by dishonest market predators.107 As one 
court put it, “[t]he methods and techniques of manipulation are 
                                                           
103 The purposes of the CEA are: (1) providing for a fair and safe market 
place by deterring manipulation and fraudulent behavior and (2) preserving the 
hedging function of the markets that was deemed essential for the protection of 
the actual producers and buyers of commodities. See S. REP. NO. 97-495 at 2 
(1982); Campbell, supra note 81, at 223; H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5–6. 
104 Campbell, supra note 81, at 223. 
105 S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 1–4. 
106 In the words of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, “[t]his 
lack of comprehension has tended to hamper effective regulation and create an 
atmosphere ripe for fraud.” Id. at 1. 
107 Id. 
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limited only by the ingenuity of man.”108 
If every gain, regardless of whether it was ill gotten, attaches to 
a corresponding loss, it necessarily follows that, in situations 
where a manipulator’s gains exceed the plaintiff’s loss, the 
manipulator will improperly receive the money of another investor 
who likely does not realize that he has suffered a loss as a result of 
the manipulator’s conduct.109 In short, the violator of the CEA 
would conceivably be allowed to keep money earned from his 
manipulative conduct that should rightfully be returned to another 
investor or many other investors who may not even realize that 
they have been defrauded. 
This idea is reinforced by the fact that futures markets have 
been characterized as “the country’s largest gambling dens,”110 and 
that they often appeal to those with gambling dispositions.111 
Accordingly, one might postulate that speculators who are 
investing with this mindset are expecting to lose money on some or 
even most investments. While it is inevitable that many of these 
“gambling” investors will lose on some of their investments, these 
speculators may not be aware or concerned that any particular loss 
came from the illegal conduct of another person.112 
Further, their losses would necessarily benefit another market 
participant by virtue of the “zero sum” nature of the markets.113 If 
those losses were the result of an illegal market manipulation, and if 
at least a portion of every loss ends up in the hands of the 
manipulator, it becomes evident how a manipulator of the markets 
                                                           
108 Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971). 
109 Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286–87 (2d Cir. 1980). The “zero 
sum” language means that for every transaction “every gain can be matched with 
a corresponding loss.” Id. 
110 Sackheim, supra note 49, at 54. 
111 Sackheim, supra note 49, at 54. 
112 Such investors may not realize there is anything they can do to recoup 
losses because they think that losses are just part of routine market operation or 
investors may realize their options but conclude that the loss was so 
insignificant that it was is not worth trying to recover their losses in court. In 
either event, these investors are not concerned about recovering their losses; they 
will not bring actions and the lost funds will not be sought after. 
113 Leist, 638 F.2d at 286–87. 
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could benefit from his wrongdoing. The situation is akin to a thief 
taking a small sum of money from everyone he knows in the hope 
that none of his victims will realize the theft. Most victims would 
not realize that they were missing any money, and even if a victim 
were to realize his loss, he may determine that the relatively small 
loss is not worth the time and resources needed to recover it. 
Nonetheless, the fact that no one objected to the thefts does not 
exonerate the thief. Similarly, it seems perverse to let a violator of 
the CEA keep money that was, in whole or in part, fraudulently 
obtained from an honest market participant. Rather, the 
defendant’s ill-gotten profits should be disgorged or rescinded 
through a more flexible interpretation of actual damages under the 
CEA. 
C.  The Parallel Language in the SEA and CEA Suggest a 
Parallel Interpretation of Actual Damages is Proper 
The bodies of law addressed by the SEA and the CEA—
securities law and commodities law, respectively—are closely 
related114 and have comparable provisions relating to fraud.115 In 
particular, the damages provisions under § 22(c) of the CEA and § 
28(a) of the SEA are similarly worded.116 This has led many courts 
to use securities law cases, such as Loftsgaarden, to guide them in 
interpreting the damages provisions under the CEA.117 Because of 
                                                           
114 Id. at 298 n.14 (drawing an analogy between securities law and 
commodities law); see also id. at 301 n.17 (“[T]he cases under the CEA, 
numerous and consistent as they are, cannot be taken in isolation but must be 
considered along with the vast body of law under the securities statutes which 
set the tone during the late ‘40’s, the ‘50’s, the ‘60’s, and the early ‘70’s, and 
on which the CEA decisions relied.”). 
115 See Sackheim, supra note 49, at 82 (noting similarity between § 4b of 
the CEA to antifraud provisions of the SEA, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
116 In an effort to determine the meaning of actual damages under the CEA, 
Judge G. Harvey Boswell sitting in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Tennessee, Western Division noted that “[b]ecause CEA § 
22(c)tracks [sic] the language of section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 . . . cases dealing with securities fraud provide direction.” In re Cannon, 
230 B.R. 546, 594 n.71 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). 
117 See id. at 594; Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53, 55 
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their similarities, the congruence of their purposes, and the overlap 
of the two markets, an interpretation of actual damages under the 
CEA should be made in light of the decisions interpreting the same 
language under the SEA. 
The similarities between the SEA and CEA are well recognized 
by courts, commentators and legislators.118 Judge Friendly’s 
expression of the similarities in purpose and legislative approach to 
the laws promulgated under the CEA and SEA is particularly clear: 
While there are differences between the commodities and 
securities fields, what is relevant to the present question is 
the common legislative objective of insuring fair dealing for 
investors on what are important public markets, and the 
common legislative approach to attaining this objective. The 
analogy between the two fields has been repeatedly 
recognized by Congress. (citations omitted). The 1936 
amendments [to the CEA] arose from an explicit concern to 
make protection in the commodities field as strong as it was 
in the securities field, lest the unscrupulous would simply 
transfer this [sic] operations from one market to another.119 
Though the focus of Judge Friendly’s opinion was implied private 
rights of action under the CEA,120 the analogy drawn between the 
commodities and securities fields is equally applicable to the 
interpretation of actual damages—the remedy prescribed by both 
the CEA and SEA for the same private rights of action that Judge 
                                                           
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 
486, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
118 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 
389 n.88 (1982) (wording of § 4(b) of the CEA and § 10(b) of SEA is similar); 
Leist, 638 F.2d at 298 n.14 (“The analogy between the two [commodities and 
securities] fields has been repeatedly recognized by congress.”) (citations 
omitted); Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594 n.71 (recognizing analogous wording in 
damages provisions of the SEA and CEA); H.R. REP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 6–7 
(1982) (noting the jurisdictional overlaps between the SEC and CFTC); 
Sackheim, supra note 49, at 82 (noting similarity between § 4b of CEA to 
antifraud provisions of the SEA, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; also noting same 
standard of proof applied in SEC and CFTC administrative enforcement 
proceedings). 
119 Leist, 638 F.2d at 298 n.14 (citations omitted). 
120 Id. at 285. 
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Friendly discussed in Leist.121 
Judge Friendly’s analogy, based on legislative findings,122 is 
reinforced by the fact that developments in commodities law have 
often paralleled earlier developments in securities law.123 Examples 
include the recognition of a private right of action124 under the 
respective legislations and the development of similar regulatory 
commissions.125 
After the enactment of the CEA, futures trading evolved to 
encompass more than just agricultural commodities and natural 
resources and began to include trading of financial instruments and 
indices of corporate securities.126 Naturally, the reach of the SEA 
and the CEA, and the scope of their respective regulatory 
commissions, the SEC and the CFTC, began to overlap.127 
Congress, in the House Reports accompanying the 1982 
amendments to the CEA, recognized this overlap and tellingly 
suggested a similar policy approach with regards to the respective 
regulatory bodies under the CEA and SEA: “If the CFTC is to 
regulate whole new types of contracts, contracts which will include 
securities now the responsibility of the SEC, thus drawing the two 
markets closer together, prudent public policy dictates that the 
rules governing the trading and marketing of their respective 
                                                           
121 Specifically, § 22(c) of the CEA and § 28(a) of the SEA contain the 
actual damages language for private rights of action under the respective Acts. 
Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594 n.71. 
122 Leist, 638 F.2d at 298 n.14. 
123 See Curran, 456 U.S. at 379 (“The routine recognition of a private 
remedy under the CEA prior to our decision in Cort v. Ash was comparable to 
the routine acceptance of an analogous remedy under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.”); Sackheim, supra note 49, at 82 (explaining that the CFTC was 
modeled after the SEC). 
124 Curran, 456 U.S. at 379. 
125 Sackheim, supra note 49, at 82 (noting that the CFTC was modeled 
after the SEC). 
126 H.R. REP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5 (1982). The original purposes of the CEA 
were “providing opportunities for hedging against future price fluctuations in 
commodities and mechanisms for locking in commodity prices at future dates.” 
Id. at 4. 
127 Id. at 5. 
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products be harmonized.”128 
Such parallelism in regulatory advancements in the SEA and 
CEA leads to a common sense conclusion that interpretation of the 
actual damages provision in the CEA should also parallel the 
interpretation of actual damages in the SEA—an issue that the 
Loftsgaarden case addressed.129 
1.  Randall v. Loftsgaarden: A Flexible Interpretation of Actual 
Damages under the SEA 
Randall v. Loftsgaarden, the leading case in support of a 
flexible interpretation of actual damages under the SEA, is 
persuasive for finding a similar flexible interpretation of the same 
language under the CEA.130 The case involved investors who were 
fraudulently induced to buy into a real estate tax shelter scheme 
that was intended to provide a tax benefit to investors by creating 
more deductible expenses.131 The jury found the defendant liable 
under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,132 § 10(b) of the 
SEA,133 SEC rule 10b-5134 and state law securities claims.135 
                                                           
128 Id. at 13–14. 
129 See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663 (1986). 
130 See In re Cannon, 230 B.R. 546, 593–95 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (using 
Loftsgaarden rationale to determine the extent of actual damages under the 
CEA); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53, 54–56 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(discussing Loftsgaarden to determine if actual damages required an offset for 
plaintiff gains under the CEA); Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 
F. Supp. 486, 490–95 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (using Loftsgaarden to determine the 
extent of actual damages under the CEA). 
131 Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 650–51. 
132 § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 “provides that an investor harmed 
by prospectus fraud may sue ‘to recover the consideration paid for such security 
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon 
tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.’” Id. at 
651–52 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2)). 
133 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. 
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 389 n.88 (1982) (noting that the wording of § 4(b) of the 
CEA and § 10(b) of SEA is similar). 
134 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1985); See Sackheim, supra note 49, at 82 
(noting similarity between § 4b of CEA to antifraud provisions of the SEA, § 
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Because the plaintiffs’ investments were worthless by the time 
they brought suit, the trial court ordered a full rescissory remedy 
under § 12(2).136 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed and remanded for a new trial.137 It held that both § 12(2) 
and § 10(b) needed to comport with the theory of actual damages 
permitting a plaintiff to recover no more than the equivalent of the 
harm suffered, and as such, the measure of rescission should have 
been offset by the amount received in tax benefits stemming from 
the investment.138 The court reasoned that the § 10(b) claim was 
dependent on § 28(a) of the SEA, which limits recovery to actual 
damages.139 The Eighth Circuit noted, in reference to the § 12(2) 
claim, that although “the words ‘actual damages’ do not appear in 
the 1933 Act, . . . [rescission should be] substantially equivalent to 
the damages permitted under section 28(a).”140 In essence, the court 
found that although a rescissory remedy, authorized under § 12(2), 
would award the plaintiff with more than actual damages, recovery 
should be limited to the harm suffered because the defendant was 
also found liable under § 10(b), which limits recovery to actual 
damages.141 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax benefits 
received were not income received and thus should not have offset 
                                                           
10(b) and Rule 10b-5; also noting same standard of proof applied in SEC and 
CFTC administrative enforcement proceedings). 
135 Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 651. 
136 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2007). 
137 Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 652. 
138 Id. 
139 § 28(a) provides that “no person permitted to maintain a suit for 
damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction 
of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual 
damages on account of the act complained of.” 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a). 
140 Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1986). Under the 
rescissory approach originally employed by the District Court, plaintiffs would 
have been entitled to total recoveries ranging from $64,610 to $96,385. Under 
the Court of Appeals’ final ruling, however, plaintiffs could recover only 
amounts ranging from $506 to $7,666. Id. at 961. 
141 Id. at 954. 
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the recovery provided for by the District Court.142 The Court 
agreed with the Court of Appeals that § 28(a) of the SEA strictly 
limits recovery to actual damages.143 Nonetheless, it held rescission 
to be the appropriate remedy, implying that actual damages in the 
context of the SEA are not limited to strict compensatory 
damages.144 
Loftsgaarden is an important decision for two reasons. First, it 
provided a basis for a remedy of rescission for a § 10(b) claim, 
despite language within § 28(a) of the SEA limiting recovery to 
actual damages.145 Second, in dicta, Loftsgaarden implied that 
recovery under the actual damages language of § 28 (a) of the SEA 
is flexible and could be greater than a party’s out-of-pocket loss.146 
Loftsgaarden demonstrated a logical basis for finding that 
rescission is at times an appropriate remedy under the SEA.147 The 
Court noted that § 12(2), which provides for a remedy of 
rescission, was not amended a year after its enactment when § 
28(a), providing for actual damages on § 10(b) claims, was 
enacted.148 It reasoned, therefore, that § 28(a) was not intended to 
limit the measure of recovery provided for by § 12(2).149 If there is 
no mandatory offset for rescission under § 12(2), the same should 
be true for § 10(b). Consequently, unless Congress intended to 
have inconsistent results for the same remedy, offsetting 
limitations to rescission should not be compulsory.150 
Aside from having a logical basis, the Court also found circuit 
                                                           
142 Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 658. The theory is that if tax benefits were 
income received then they would offset the recovery under a rescissory remedy. 
Id. 
143 Id. at 660. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 662. 
146 Id. at 663–64. The Court found that the tax benefits that the plaintiffs 
received were not sufficient to be considered windfalls and the tax code would 
serve to reduce any gains that the plaintiffs received as a result of the damages 
awarded. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 663–64. 
147 Id. at 661. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 662–63. 
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court precedent for the rescission remedy under SEA § 28(a).151 
The Ninth Circuit stated, in Blackie v. Barrack, that “[w]hile out 
of pocket loss is the ordinary standard in a 10b-5 suit, it is within 
the discretion of the district judge in appropriate circumstances to 
apply a rescissory measure.”152 The Loftsgaarden Court, citing 
Blackie v. Barrack with approval, shows that, in certain situations, 
a more expansive definition of actual damages may be appropriate. 
In fact, the Court in Loftsgaarden went so far as to label 
recovery under § 28(a) of the SEA as “flexible.”153 The Court 
recognized that one of Congress’s intentions in enacting the SEA 
was to deter fraud and manipulative practices in the securities 
markets154 and that strict adherence to the dictionary definition of 
actual damages would contradict that salutary purpose.155 Thus, 
the Court reasoned that deterrence warranted a flexible 
interpretation of actual damages.156 In those situations where the 
defendant stands to benefit from his fraudulent behavior because he 
received more than the plaintiff lost, “[it] is more appropriate to 
give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let 
the fraudulent party keep them.”157 A contrary decision would 
provide an incentive for fraudulent behavior because it would 
protect perpetrators of securities fraud from liability to many of 
their victims.158 
This circumstance led the Court in Loftsgaarden to find that 
“the mere fact that the receipt of . . . benefits, plus a full recovery 
under a rescissory measure of damages, may place a § 10(b) 
plaintiff in a better position than he would have been in absent the 
                                                           
151 Id. at 662. 
152 Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
153 Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 663. 
154 S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 2 (1982). 
155 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); see 
also Herman v. MacLean, 459 U.S. 375, 386–87 (1983); Sec. Exch. Comm’n 
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
156 Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 663. 
157 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (8th Cir. 1965); see also Falk v. 
Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199 (1922) (Cardozo, J.). 
158 Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 664. 
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fraud, does not establish that the flexible limits of § 28(a) have been 
exceeded.”159 Thus, the Court seemed to believe that, in certain 
factual situations, it is not anathematic to the meaning of actual 
damages for a plaintiff to be made more than whole.160 
2.  Commodities Cases After Loftsgaarden 
The principle enunciated in Loftsgaarden—that a fraudulent 
party should not be allowed to benefit from his fraud161—has been 
recognized in a number of commodities cases.162 However, such 
decisions have not always resulted in the plaintiff recovering 
                                                           
159 Id. at 663. 
160 Id. at 666–67. The Court restricted its holding to the facts of the case 
and found that in certain situations courts can use their discretion, where 
appropriate, to bar a rescission remedy under § 10(b). Id. The Court noted the 
potential for abuse; wherein § 12(2) plaintiffs will wait until they get their tax 
benefits and then file their claims for rescission, thereby maximizing their return 
on the investment that went wrong. Id. The Court thought that other courts 
could adequately deal with this potential abuse by barring rescissory recovery in 
those circumstances. Id. at 666. Nonetheless, the Court held that in this 
circumstance the rescissory recovery under § 12(2) is not required to be offset by 
the tax benefits received under the tax shelter investment, despite the fact that it 
may make the plaintiff more than whole. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 667. 
 Some courts before Loftsgaarden ruled out a rescission remedy under § 
10(b). See e.g., Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706 (7th 
Cir. 1987), and at least one circuit has continued to bar rescission for such 
claims. See Zahorik v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 1987 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14085, *4 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 1987). However, the majority of federal 
circuits have followed Loftsgaarden. See, e.g., Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30, 
45–46 (1st Cir. 2003); In re Broderbund/Learning Co. Sec. Litig. v. Mattell, 
Inc., 294 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2002); DCD Programs v. Leighton, 90 
F.3d 1442, 1451 (9th Cir. 1996); McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm’t, 65 
F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1549, 
1553–54 (10th Cir. 1992); Rousseff v. E.F. Hutton Co., 843 F.2d 1326, 1328–
29 (11th Cir. 1988); Lycan v. Walters, 904 F. Supp. 884 (S.D. Ind. 1995); 
Prudential-Bache Secur., Inc. v. Cullather, 678 F. Supp. 601, 607 (E.D. Va. 
1987). 
161 Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 663–64. 
162 See Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); 
Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987). 
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damages in excess of his out-of-pocket losses.163 These courts have 
recognized that recovery beyond out-of-pocket loss is appropriate 
only if limiting recovery would contradict goals of equity or 
deterrence.164 It appears from the cases that when policy goals of 
equity or deterrence are sufficiently great, a flexible interpretation 
of actual damages and thus, a recovery beyond out-of-pocket loss 
is appropriate.165 
This principle is well illustrated in the commodity arena.166 In 
Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.,167 the defendants 
manipulated the silver market in violation of the CEA and the 
plaintiff sought out-of-pocket losses and lost profits.168 With 
regard to the out-of-pocket losses, the court found that the losses 
must be offset by the gain in value of their silver holdings, thus 
limiting the recovery to net economic injury.169 Despite so holding, 
the court read the Loftsgaarden decision “as supporting the 
proposition that there is no rigid requirement that a plaintiff must 
always be limited to its net economic injury where such a limitation 
would be inequitable or contrary to deterrent goals.”170 The 
plaintiffs in Minpeco were limited in recovery to their net economic 
loss because they “made no showing that if an offset [was] 
imposed [there] defendants [would] be either unjustly enriched or 
sheltered from any ‘appreciable liability’ as in Loftsgaarden.”171 
Nevertheless, the district court recognized the availability of 
broader recovery where appropriate.172 
Another commodities case that acknowledged the principle set 
forth in Loftsgaarden is Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro.173 In Apex Oil 
Co., the claimant actually profited from the fraudulent practices of 
                                                           
163 Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 55; Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 489. 
164 Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 489. 
165 See id.; Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 55. 
166 See Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 55; Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 489. 
167 676 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
168 Id. at 487. 
169 Id. at 490. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 489. 
173 744 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
PEARCE FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/1/07 7:06 PM  
 COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT 477 
the defendant.174 The plaintiff wanted the court to give him a 
windfall by awarding him the profits gained by the defendant as a 
result of the fraudulent conduct,175 and cited Loftsgaarden to 
support the idea that such an award would accomplish the 
deterrent goals enunciated in the decision.176 The court rejected that 
idea because the plaintiff profited from the fraud.177 In so holding, 
the court decided that deterrence alone could not justify such a 
recovery.178 However, the court did support the reading of 
Loftsgaarden in Minpeco that damages can make plaintiffs more 
than whole if they are awarded in the interests of equity or 
deterrence.179 Therefore, it appears the inequity that would result 
from the requested damage award was great enough to overcome 
deterrence concerns. 
In order to effectively deter fraudulent misconduct in the 
securities field, the meaning of actual damages has been construed 
broadly, thereby allowing for either rescission or disgorgement.180 
In light of the Congressional findings for the 1982 amendments to 
the CEA and the overlapping nature of the securities and 
                                                           
174 Id. at 54. The decision dealt only with the damages to be awarded for 
the remaining counterclaims from a related commodities fraud litigation. Id. 
175 Id. at 54–55. 
176 Id. at 55. 
177 Id. at 56. 
178 Id. 
179 Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
180 See Kane v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 916 F.2d 643, 646–47 
(11th Cir. 1990) (awarding, in a securities action under state law, where the 
award of damages is, by statute, the same as it is under federal law, rescissory 
damages and citing the same deterrence principle espoused in Loftsgaarden as 
its reasoning); Estate of Pidcock v. Sunnyland America, 726 F. Supp. 1322, 
1329 (S.D. Ga. 1989) (“In the case of a defrauded seller in an action brought 
under Rule 10b-5, ‘where the defrauding purchaser receives more than the 
seller’s actual loss, the damages are the purchaser’s profits.’ . . . Moreover, once 
the element of fraud has been established, as it was in this case, ‘any profit 
subsequently realized by the defrauding purchaser should be deemed the 
proximate consequence of the fraud.’”[citations omitted]); In re Der, 113 B.R. 
218, 231 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) (citing Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 
662 (1986)) (supporting a “rescissory” measure of recovery); see also Siebel v. 
Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984); Lawton v. Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 
428, 442 (D.R.I. 2005). 
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commodities markets,181 this idea should apply to the CEA as well 
as the SEA. Accordingly, several courts in the commodities context 
have allowed recovery of gross trading losses as a result of 
fraudulent misconduct without an offset for profitable trades.182 
Other courts have allowed recovery of lost profits to the extent 
that evidence permits a jury to extrapolate what the position of the 
markets would have been absent the fraud.183 
In light of the Minpeco and Apex Oil Co. cases, it is sensible to 
apply the rationale employed in Loftsgaarden—conferring a 
benefit on the defrauded party rather than permitting the miscreant 
to keep the proceeds of his fraud—to the recovery of damages 
under the CEA. The application of the Loftsgaarden principle, 
however, is not without limitations. The Minpeco and Apex Oil Co. 
cases also show that the Court’s reasoning in Loftsgaarden should 
be applied with discretion184 and should only have an effect when 
“limitation [of recovery] would be inequitable or contrary to 
deterrent goals.”185 
Loftsgaarden should not be interpreted as requiring recovery 
beyond out-of-pocket loss in the context of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
claims under § 28(a) of the SEA. Rather, Loftsgaarden put forth 
alternative means of recovery that are appropriate in certain 
                                                           
181 H.R. REP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 13 (1982). 
182 See generally Kuhland v. Lincolnwood, Inc., No. R 79-493-80-47, 1986 
WL 65629 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 14, 1986); Gatens v. Int’l Precious Metals Corp., 
No. R 81-673-05, 1985 WL 55298 (C.F.T.C. June 18, 1985); DeAngelis v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., No. R 80-1278-81-187, 1984 WL 47628 
(C.F.T.C. Mar. 14, 1984). 
183 See generally Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 
486 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Strobl v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 582 F. Supp. 770 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
184 See Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 650 F. Supp. 1091, 1113 (N.D. Ill. 
1986) (acknowledging, in a securities law case under § 28(a) of the SEA, the 
availability of rescissory or disgorgement damages under the same line of 
reasoning as in Loftsgaarden but not awarding either based on the facts of the 
case); see also C. C. Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1955) (“It 
would be a perversion of the statute to allow remittances made in conjunction 
with a void and unlawful security to be exempt from restitution, and would 
permit unjust enrichment under the guise of statutory definition.”). 
185 Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 490. 
PEARCE FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/1/07 7:06 PM  
 COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT 479 
circumstances to accomplish the policy goals expressed in the 
SEA.186 Many cases, such as Minpeco and Apex Oil Co., still award 
actual damages according to the traditional, strict interpretation of 
actual damages, notwithstanding the decision in Loftsgaarden.187 In 
many cases, especially those where a defendant does not stand to 
benefit from the fraud by virtue of the penalty imposed or where 
deterrence and equity goals would not be served by a recovery 
beyond out-of-pocket loss, the strict interpretation of actual 
damages is appropriate. Therefore, a more widespread application 
of flexible actual damages in this area is likely to be reserved for the 
most egregious and inequitable situations. 
3.  Securities Law Should be a Guide to Interpreting Actual 
Damages Under the CEA 
Given the similar wording of § 22(c) of the CEA and § 28(a) of 
the SEA,188 the similarities in purpose and legislative approach of 
the two Acts189 and the growing overlap of markets,190 the 
interpretation of actual damages in the CEA should be consistent 
with the interpretation of the same language in the SEA. Using the 
SEA as a guidepost to determining damages under the CEA is a 
sensible method that has already been adopted by courts.191 In 
particular, courts have used the decision in Loftsgaarden to infer 
that actual damages can provide for “different measures of 
                                                           
186 Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986) (citing Blackie v. 
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
187 See Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 490; Rowe, 650 F. Supp. at 1113; Apex 
Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Pelletier 
v. Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1989) (deciding in a Rule 
10b-5 case, despite citing precedent for rescissory remedies, the appropriate 
measure of damages to be strict actual damages and awards nothing for failure to 
prove any out-of-pocket loss). 
188 In re Cannon, 230 B.R. 546, 594 n.71 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). 
189 Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 298 n.14 (2d Cir. 1980). 
190 H.R. REP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5 (1982). 
191 Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594 (reading from Loftsgaarden, that strictly 
adhering to a narrow definition of actual damages that limits plaintiffs to their 
net economic loss, works contrary to the deterrent purpose of the Act); see also 
Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 55; Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 490. 
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recovery” beyond net economic loss, “including rescission and 
restitution.”192 Some courts have used the Loftsgaarden decision to 
analyze how damages for a CEA violation could be awarded but 
have not gone so far as to award damages beyond the standard net 
economic loss.193 Still, there is a growing recognition among judges 
that actual damages in CEA cases may be measured in ways that 
exceed mere net economic loss.194 The decision in In Re Cannon 
shows that where “true compensatory damages are not accurately 
represented by [] ‘net economic loss,’ but rather, by . . . the gross 
losses in [an] account,” an expanded interpretation of the actual 
damages provision of the CEA would be appropriate.195 
D.  Other Areas of Law Support the Same Principle that Calls 
for a Flexible Interpretation of Actual Damages 
The rationale that allowed the Loftsgaarden Court to award 
rescissory damages despite a statutory limitation to actual damages 
is neither unique to that case nor to securities law.196 For example, 
copyright law provides for actual damages, including the infringer’s 
profits or, in the alternative, statutory damages.197 “Courts and 
                                                           
192 See Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594. 
193 Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 58; Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 494–95. 
194 Cannon, 230 B.R. at 595. 
195 Id. 
196 Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663 (1986). See also On Davis 
v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (invoking a similar 
principle of construction to favor victims of copyright infringement over 
infringers); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965) (“[It] is more 
appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let 
the fraudulent party keep them.”); see generally Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199 
(1922) (Cardozo, J.). 
197 17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (2004). § 504 provides: 
(a) In general. Except as otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of 
copyright is liable for either- 
(1) the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of 
the infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or 
(2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c). 
(b) Actual damages and profits. The copyright owner is entitled to 
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commentators agree [that actual damages] should be broadly 
construed to favor victims of [copyright] infringement.”198 In On 
Davis v. The Gap,199 the Second Circuit used reasoning similar to 
that used by the Supreme Court in Loftsgaarden to find that 
licensing fees should be included in actual damages when no actual 
damages for copyright infringement can be proved.200 In the court’s 
view, “as between leaving the victim of the illegal taking with 
nothing, and charging the illegal taker with the reasonable cost of 
what he took, the latter, at least in some circumstances, is the 
preferable solution.”201 Moreover, “[t]o rule that the owner’s loss 
of the fair market value of the license fees he might have exacted of 
the defendant do not constitute ‘actual damages,’ would mean that 
                                                           
recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the 
infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the 
infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual 
damages. In establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is 
required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the 
infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the 
elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted 
work. 
Id. 
198 Davis, 246 F.3d at 164. This appears to be the same principle that is 
enunciated in Loftsgaarden and there is ample support for this construction of 
actual damages in copyright case law. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT 
LAW AND PRACTICE 1167 (1994) (“Within reason, any ambiguities should be 
resolved in favor of the copyright owner.”); 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
14.02A, 14–12 (2007) (“Uncertainty will not preclude a recovery of actual 
damages if the uncertainty is as to amount, but not as to the fact that actual 
damages are attributable to the infringement.”); Fitzgerald Publ’g Co. v. Baylor 
Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1118 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A]ctual damages are 
not . . . narrowly focused.”);  Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. High Society 
Magazine, 778 F.2d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that when courts are 
confronted with imprecision in calculating damages, they “should err on the 
side of guaranteeing the plaintiff a full recovery”). Cf. In Design v. K-Mart 
Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 564 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that any doubts in 
calculating profits which result from the infringer’s failure to present adequate 
proof of its costs are to be resolved in favor of the copyright holder), abrogated 
on other grounds Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 
199 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001). 
200 Id. at 164. 
201 Id. at 166. 
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in such circumstances an infringer may steal with impunity.”202 
Based on that reasoning, the court found that even though the 
statute specified actual damages, the “statutory term ‘actual 
damages’ is broad enough” to cover this type of recovery.203 
Property law, which has historically applied the disgorgement 
principle in cases of intentional fraud,204 is another example of an 
expansive interpretation of actual damages. In Dickson v. 
Patterson,205 a property fraud case, the Supreme Court held that 
the disgorgement of profits obtained from the fraudulent 
transaction was the appropriate remedy.206 In Dickson, the 
defendant and the plaintiff each bought a half interest in the same 
property.207 The defendant then sold both parties’ property 
interests for a modest profit to a third party.208 The defendant, 
unbeknownst to the plaintiff, bought the property back from the 
third party at the same price and sold part of it again on his own to 
a fourth party for a substantial profit.209 The Court found this to 
be impermissible and fashioned a remedy whereby the deeds 
executed with fraudulent intent were set aside, leaving the property 
in the state it was before the fraud began and, in addition, the 
fraudulent party was compelled to disgorge half of the profits he 
made from the fraudulent transactions.210 The Court in 
Loftsgaarden applied a similar remedy whereby the plaintiff was 
able to retain the tax benefits resulting from the investment in the 
tax shelter and also receive rescission, thereby returning him to the 
position he was in prior to the fraud.211 
                                                           
202 Id. 
203 Id. See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539 (1985) (there the Supreme Court intimated, similarly to the court in 
Davis, that royalties would be recoverable under actual damages). 
204 Restatement First of Restitution § 151, 202 Cmt. b, c (1937); 4 Scott, 
Trusts §§ 507, 508, 508.1 (2d ed. 1956). 
205 160 U.S. 584 (1896). 
206 Id. at 592. 
207 Id. at 586. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 587. 
210 Id. at 592. 
211 Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 667 (1986). 
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The Loftsgaarden principle does not stand alone. It is 
paralleled in other areas of law and should be applied to 
commodities law. Although the statute restricts recovery to “actual 
damages,” that term can be interpreted broadly enough to avoid the 
injustice and perverse policy that would result from a narrow 
interpretation. 
E.  The Need for a Flexible Interpretation of Actual Damages 
Despite the Powers of the CFTC 
The CFTC has the power to bring suit in district court against 
violators of the CEA.212 In doing so, it can ask for remedies, 
including disgorgement of profits,213 monetary penalties214 and a 
permanent injunction.215 Given that the CFTC can stop defendants 
from profiting from their wrongdoing by bringing suit in district 
court,216 one may wonder why disgorgement or rescission would be 
an appropriate remedy under the private right of action for actual 
damages. 
There are many benefits to allowing a private right of action for 
actual damages. First, such private actions add to the efficiency of 
the court system.217 Also, this would help ease the burden on the 
“overburdened” CFTC reparations program.218 Further, Congress 
has indicated that providing for a private right of action and 
awarding a successful plaintiff actual damages would provide 
immediate relief to commodity investors from fraud.219 The reason 
that commodity investors needed this avenue of relief was because 
of the shortcomings of the reparations section of the CFTC.220 The 
                                                           
212 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (2000); see also Commodities Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2003). 
213 Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1382. 
214 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(1). 
215 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a)–(b); Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (5th Cir. 1978). 
216 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1. 
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Senate Committee referred to a private right of action as “one 
possible solution to the . . . ineffectiveness of the CFTC 
reparations program.”221 
There are also many advantages to permitting the courts to 
interpret actual damages loosely to allow for disgorgement of 
profits or rescission in situations where the defendant stands to 
profit from his misconduct. Aside from easing the burden on the 
CFTC, it would also promote efficiency in the courts; assuming 
that private rights of action will be brought prior to CFTC 
proceedings, the issue of disgorgement would not need to be 
litigated in front of the CFTC because the manipulators will have 
already been shorn of all their profits.222 Fewer litigable issues 
would necessarily speed up the trial process and allow for the 
resolution of more CFTC initiated claims. Commodities customers 
would continue to exercise their rights to initiate proceedings under 
the CEA.223 Thus, it is sensible to implement a more flexible 
interpretation of actual damages if such a shift can further relieve 
the “erratic, overburdened and rarely effective”224 CFTC 
reparations program. 
                                                           
221 Id. Allowing the district courts the flexibility of interpreting actual 
damages in certain situations to permit disgorgement is not without judicial 
support. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 
1300 (5th Cir. 1978). “In an action to enforce the requirements of a remedial 
statute, such as the Commodity Exchange Act (‘the CEA’), a district court ‘has 
broad discretion to fashion appropriate relief.’” Commodities Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (citing 
Muller, 570 F.2d at 1300). 
222 The assumption that private rights of action would be brought prior to a 
CFTC proceeding is reasonable because if a CFTC proceeding predated the 
private action, then the likelihood is that the profits will have already been 
disgorged and penalties will have been assessed. Thus, there will be nothing left 
for the private investor to recover. In addition, it will be presumed that because 
of the heavy load of the CFTC, there will be a delay in their bringing actions 
against manipulators. 
223 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2000). 
224 S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 51. 
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V. ACTUAL DAMAGES UNDER THE CEA 
This Note suggests two solutions to resolve the problem 
presented when, in the context of a private right of action under the 
CEA, the defendant stands to benefit from his misconduct because 
he profited more than the plaintiff lost. For either solution to be 
effective, a flexible interpretation of actual damages is a necessary 
predicate. 
The first solution is simply using a flexible interpretation of 
actual damages that can be applied by the courts based on the 
factual circumstances. In the situation explored in this Note, courts 
could either afford a remedy of full rescission for situations similar 
to that in Loftsgaarden or they could provide for disgorgement of 
the defendant’s profits, usually resulting in a windfall to the victim 
of the fraud, as has happened in some rule 10b-5 cases.225 
A court, in determining whether to apply a remedy of 
rescission or disgorgement, would need guidance as to when and 
how to apply such remedies. The courts could look directly to 
securities law and in particular the line of cases following 
Loftsgaarden to determine the level of proof required to support 
either remedy.226 There is ample case law in the securities realm 
                                                           
225 See Lawton v. Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 428, 442 (D.R.I. 2005); Estate 
of Pidcock v. Sunnyland America, 726 F. Supp 1322, 1329 (S.D. Ga. 1989). It 
is important to note that a remedy of disgorgement in both securities and 
commodities law is the result of an exercise of a district court’s equitable 
powers. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978); 
Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1379. Thus, simply proving a violation of either 
statute would give the court “power to fashion an appropriate remedy.” Sec. 
Exch. Comm’n v. Manor Nursing Centers, 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 
1972). 
226 See Pidcock, 726 F. Supp. at 1329 (“In the case of a defrauded seller in 
an action brought under Rule 10b-5, ‘where the defrauding purchaser receives 
more than the seller’s actual loss, the damages are the purchaser’s profits.’ . . .  
Moreover, once the element of fraud has been established, as it was in this case, 
‘any profit subsequently realized by the defrauding purchaser should be deemed 
the proximate consequence of the fraud.’” [citations omitted]); In re Der, 113 
B.R. 218, 231 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) (citing Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 
647, 662 (1986)) (supporting a “rescissory” measure of recovery); see also 
Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984); Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 
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that has followed the Loftsgaarden decision and would provide a 
useful starting point for courts in determining when to apply either 
rescissory or disgorgement damages.227 
In the alternative, this Note proposes a second solution. The 
profits retained by a defendant beyond what the plaintiff is entitled 
to recover could be disgorged and transferred into a fund or trust 
under the control of the CFTC for the purpose of offering aid to 
the victims of commodities fraud. There is support for a judicially 
imposed remedy of this sort.228 Under Rhode Island law, for 
example, a constructive trust can be imposed as a remedy for 
unjust enrichment.229 Under securities law, a common fund or trust 
can be established to benefit all plaintiffs in class actions alleging an 
unjust enrichment claim.230 The court, in Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. 
Glauberman, recognized that “disgorgement is a well recognized 
device to undo unjust enrichment resulting from illegal securities 
trading.”231 The court implied that a constructive trust would be 
imposed on money obtained through unjust enrichment.232 It then 
presumed that the money in the fund would be put toward the 
benefit of the victims of the fraud or in the alternative would go 
into the treasury.233 
In fact, Congress established just this sort of fund under 
securities law, called Fair Funds, when it enacted the Sarbanes-
                                                           
at 442. 
227 See generally Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2003); In re 
Broderbund/Learning Co. Sec. Litig., 294 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002); DCD 
Programs v. Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442 (9th Cir. 1996); McMahan & Co. v. 
Wherehouse Entertainment, 65 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995); Anixter v. Home-
Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1549 (10th Cir. 1992); Rousseff v. E.F. Hutton Co., 
843 F.2d 1326 (11th Cir. 1988); Lycan v. Walters, 904 F. Supp. 884 (S.D. 
Ind. 1995); Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc. v. Cullather, 678 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. 
Va. 1987). 
228 Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 434. 
229 Id. 
230 Everett v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 460 F.3d 818, 824 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Glauberman, 90 Civ. 5205, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10982, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992). 
231 Glauberman, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *3. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at *4. 
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Oxley Act of 2002.234 The SEC provided for the same fund using 
the same language from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in Rule 1100,235 
which provides: 
In any agency process initiated by an order instituting 
proceedings in which the Commission or the hearing officer 
issues an order requiring the payment of disgorgement by a 
respondent and also assessing a civil money penalty against 
that respondent, the Commission or the hearing officer may 
order that the amount of the disgorgement and of the civil 
money penalty, together with any funds received [by the 
Commission] pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 7246(b), be used to 
create a fund for the benefit of investors who were harmed 
by the violation.236 
A similar type of fund could be imposed on the profits of a CEA 
violator that go beyond the losses of the plaintiff in an action under 
7 U.S.C. § 25. Much like the SEC’s handling of Fair Funds, the 
CFTC could then take control of the fund and distribute the 
proceeds where needed. 
 A disgorgement fund, similar to Fair Funds, may not directly 
create a greater monetary incentive to bringing suit for victims of 
fraud whose losses were small. However, such a fund would likely 
give the general public a secure sense that there is justice in the 
futures markets and that investors are not just the province of 
predators who calculate ways to steal from their prey through 
fraud and manipulation. Such a feeling of security and protection 
would improve investor confidence and encourage more investors 
to enter the market while simultaneously discouraging manipulation 
and fraud. Thus, both of the original purposes of the CEA would 
be served.237 
                                                           
234 Fair Funds was intended to benefit investors that lost money due to 
conduct of individuals or corporations that violated securities laws. It allows the 
SEC to combine disgorgement amounts and civil monetary penalties from 
securities frauds into one fund to benefit the many victims of these schemes. 15 
U.S.C. § 7246(b) (2002). 
235 17 CFR § 201.1100 (2006). 
236 Id. 
237 The purposes of the CEA are: (1) providing for a fair and safe market 
place by deterring manipulation and fraudulent behavior and (2) preserving the 
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Regardless of the preferred solution, a more flexible 
interpretation of actual damages would be a necessary predicate. 
Thus, arguments in favor of such a flexible interpretation are 
relevant for determining which solution to apply. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has set forth two workable solutions available to the 
courts. Either solution would address directly the issue of what to 
do with a defendant’s profits that exceed the losses of a plaintiff. 
Both solutions would avoid the perverse result of the defendant 
being able to profit from his wrongdoing. In addition, action by the 
district court in these situations should lighten the load on the 
CFTC in reparations proceedings. Most importantly, either 
solution would be in accord with the previously stated legislative 
goals of Congress;238 both solutions would help to deter future 
manipulation and would not have an adverse effect on the hedging 
function performed by the markets. Either solution would deter 
potential violators. Honest investors might even be encouraged to 
invest by virtue of the added level of protection they would receive 
under the Act. Added deterrence of CEA violations would also 
help the government maintain a greater measure of control over 
growing futures markets239 without discouraging investors and 
honest speculators. 
For the reasons already stated, a prudent policy for courts to 
follow in regards to the award of actual damages under 7 U.S.C. § 
25 is that in situations where the defendant’s profits exceed the 
plaintiff’s losses, the court should allow for a measure of recovery 
greater than out-of-pocket loss because “[it] is more appropriate to 
give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let 
the fraudulent party keep them.”240 
                                                           
hedging function of the markets that was deemed essential for the protection of 
the actual producers and buyers of commodities. See S. REP. NO. 97-495 at 2 
(1982); Campbell, supra note 81, at 223; H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5–6 
(1982). 
238 H.R. REP. NO. 421, at 1 (1934). 
239 H.R. REP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5. 
240 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965). 
